Realizing Monads by Kornai, András
anDrás kornai
Realizing Monads
ABSTrACT
We reconstruct monads as cyclic finite state automata whose states are what 
Leibniz calls perceptions and whose transitions are automatically triggered by the 
next time tick he calls entelechy. This goes some way toward explaining key as-
pects of the Monadology, in particular, the lack of inputs and outputs (§7) and the 
need for universal harmony (§59).
1. INTrODUCTION
Monads are important both in category theory and in programming language de-
sign, clearly demonstrating that Leibniz is greatly appreciated as the conceptual 
forerunner of much of abstract thought both in mathematics and in computer sci-
ence. Yet we suspect that Leibniz, the engineer, designer of the Stepped reck-
oner, would use the resources of the modern world to build a very different kind 
of monad. Throughout this paper, we confront Leibniz with our contemporary 
scientific understanding of the world. This is done to make sure that what we say 
is not “concretely empty” in the sense of Unger (2014). We are not interested in 
what we can say about Leibniz, but rather in what Leibniz can say about our cur-
rent world model. readers expecting some glib demonstration of how our current 
scientific theories make Leibniz look like a fool will be sorely disappointed.
Looking around, and finding a well-built Calculus ratiocinator in Turing ma-
chines, pointer machines, and similar abstract models of computation, Leibniz 
would no doubt consider his Characteristica Universalis well realized in modern 
proof checkers such as Mizar, Coq, or Agda to the extent mathematical deduc-
tion is concerned, but would be somewhat disappointed in their applicability to 
natural philosophy in general. He would also, we argue here, be rather dissatis-
fied with the category-theoretic definition of monads over a category C, given 
by an endofunctor T, and two natural transformations η : IC → T and µ : T 2→ T 
satisfying some identities we need not go into here. (The functional program-
ming definition of a monad involves a further natural transformation ‘tensorial 
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strength’ that satisfies further identities.) It is not so much the fact that the 
standard definition of monads is complex (in the ordinary sense of the word) 
that is bothersome here, but that the mathematical definition lacks some of the 
essential features that Leibniz emphasizes throughout the Monadology (which 
we will quote in the robert Latta translation, available online at http://oregon-
state.edu/instruct/phl302/texts/leibniz/monadology.html). In Section 2 we lay 
the groundwork by showing that attributing a clockwork theory of monads to 
Leibniz is, at the very least, highly plausible in the light of his other writings, 
and in Section 3 we explicate this theory in contemporary terms.
2. THE CLOCKWOrK
Leibniz makes it abundantly clear at the outset (§§1-6) that monads are atomic 
in the original sense of the word. The atoms of science, chemistry in particular, 
are known not to meet Leibniz’s criteria of atomicity, inasmuch as they are built 
from smaller units, quarks. More important, the quarks themselves are known 
not to meet these criteria in that they are characterized by attributes (charge, 
mass, color, spin) that are not constant throughout their lifetimes, can decay, 
be created out of nothing, and so on. Here we will take an unashamedly pla-
tonic view and assume, without argumentation, that well-defined mathematical 
objects such as numbers or triangles exist once and for all, and meet the persis-
tence criteria insisted upon by Leibniz. This is not to say that Leibniz himself 
was a platonist, though this is a very reasonable assumption, see e.g. Grosholz 
(1996) or Mercer (2008). Like any original thinker, Leibniz to a remarkable ex-
tent defies classification in terms of philosophical traditions, and we use the 
label platonism here only as a convenient shortcut avoiding a much longer, and 
for our purposes unnecessary, ontological discussion concerning the status of 
mathematical objects. Suffice to say that Leibniz had the contemporary com-
puter scientist’s disdain for making strong distinctions between mathematical 
models and their physical realization.
There is one assumption we will need to make: that even seemingly complex 
mathematical objects, such as cyclic groups or prime order, are in fact atomic in 
the sense relevant to Leibniz. This of course leaves a huge variety of mathe-
matical structures to choose from, very much including the current (Godement/
Mac Lane) definition of monad, so it will take special effort to show that in the 
entire mathematical bestiary it is cyclic groups of prime order that we should 
concentrate on, especially as group theory postdates Leibniz by more than a 
century. We begin with a simple form of the Chinese remainder Theorem, that 
p1, p2, …, pk for primes and arbitrary remainders r1, r2, … , rk satisfying 0 ≤ ri < pi
there is exactly one number x between 0 and p1 p2 
… pk such that dividing x by 
pi leaves remainder ri. 
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The Monadology dates from 1698, and as it happens, both 1697 and 1699 are 
primes. If we set up two clock dials with 1697 and 1699 angular steps respective-
ly, and each with a hand advancing once a second, each hand will make its round 
in less than half an hour (1800 seconds), but it will take over 33 days for the pair 
of hands to revisit the same position. With six dials and six primes, say 1693, 
1697, 1699, 1783, 1787, and 1789, each dial still revisits the same position within 
half an hour, yet the total configuration is not repeated for over 881 billion years, 
over 60 times the estimated lifetime of the universe. Leibniz, of course, was 
quite familiar with the Chinese remainder Theorem, and as the designer of the 
Stepped reckoner, was no doubt aware of these implications. 
Further, since Leibniz was a prominent supporter of the machina mundi, the 
clockwork theory of the universe, our main thesis concering the Monadology, that 
he sought to model the world as being composed of elementary clocks, is not 
at all implausible, even though the proper conceptual machinery to make this 
stick, the theory of cyclic groups, has not been invented at the time. As is often 
the case, Leibniz’s views are best characterized by his opponents, in this case 
Clarke (1715) who writes (First reply, §4): 
The Notion of the World’s being a great Machine, going on without the Interposition 
of God, as a Clock continues to go without the Assistance of a Clockmaker; is the 
Notion of Materialism and Fate, and tends […] to exclude providence and God’s 
Government in reality out of the World. 
It is a fascinating aspect of the true history of ideas that Newton, whose uni-
verse will be taken by subsequent generations to be an absolutely deterministic 
clockwork model, was himself a theist, very open to the idea of God’s direct 
intervention (Dr. Clarke is generally assumed to be Newton’s mouthpiece in 
the Clarke-Leibniz debate), and it is Leibniz who is the forerunner of the more 
deist position of the early Enlightenment, Kant in particular. Coffa (1991.14) 
actually sees Leibniz as the pivotal figure between modern logical semantics 
and the Aristotelian tradition:
How do we determine a constituency of a concept; what criteria determine whether 
a concept B is “in” the concept A? When Kant started to think about this question, 
there were two standard answers, one emerging from a long and venerable tradition, 
the other first put forth by Leibniz. The Leibniz-Arnauld correspondence clearly dis-
plays the conflict between these two standpoints. With his characteristic blend of 
genius and insanity, Leibniz had concieved a project in which the simple concepts 
would be represented by prime numbers and their composition by multiplication. 
From the Chinese number theorem (and certain assumptions about the nature of 
truth) he inferred that – given this “perfect language” all matters of truth could be 
resolved by appeal to the algorithm of division. “For example”, he explained, 
156 LEIBNIZ
if the symbolic number of man is assumed to be 6 and that of ape to be 10, it is 
evident that neither does the concept of ape contain the concept of man, nor does 
the converse hold ... If, therefore, it is asked whether the concept of the wise man 
is contained in the concept of the just man... we have only to examine whether the 
symbolic number of the just man can be exactly divided by the symbolic number 
of the wise man (Leibniz 1966. 22). 
Thanks to Boole and Gödel, today we immediately recognize the semantic 
theory put forth by Leibniz: concepts are to be analyzed into primitives, each 
primitive is to be assigned a prime number, conjunctive concepts are to be as-
signed the product of the component concepts’ numbers, and logical derivation 
is to be done by arithmetic. What Leibniz is doing here (already the subject of 
his habilitation thesis, Dissertatio de arte combinatoria) is devising a mapping from 
concepts, both simple and compound, to numbers, and modeling the calculus of 
concepts on Euclid’s theory of primes.1 This presupposes precisely the theory of 
qualities expressed in §8: For what is in the compound can come only from the simple 
elements it contains, and the Monads, if they had no qualities, would be indistinguishable 
from one another, since they do not differ in quantity.
Again, this must be contrasted with our current understanding of qualities, 
even at the price of being completely ahistoric. Leibniz, erstwhile secretary of 
the Nuremberg alchemical society (ross 1974), was keenly aware of the concep-
tual problems attendant to transmutation, especially as these issues, transub-
stansiation in particular, occupied central position in scholastic debates. Consid-
er the property or quality of tasting salty. Today we know that salt is NaCl, and 
neither constituent tastes salty. Similarly, water is liquid at room temperature, 
but neither H nor O are. We derive salty taste as an essentially geometric prop-
erty, with NaCl molecules having the shape (including distribution of electrical 
charges) that makes them fit well with certain receptors on the tongue, and the 
same kind of explanation, attraction of water molecules to one another, is used 
in computing the liquid state. 
Leibniz, while obviously not aware of the specifics that will take centuries 
from alchemy to quantum chemistry to develop, was nevertheless very clear in 
his support for configurationally emerging qualities: §64. Thus the organic body of 
each living being is a kind of divine machine or natural automaton, which infinitely sur-
passes all artificial automata. For a machine made by the skill of man is not a machine 
in each of its parts. For instance, the tooth of a brass wheel has parts or fragments which 
for us are not artificial products, and which do not have the special characteristics of the 
machine, for they give no indication of the use for which the wheel was intended. But the 
machines of nature, namely, living bodies, are still machines in their smallest parts ad 
1  Subsequently, he will refine the system by introducing a separate list for negative 
properties, akin to the denominator in fractions, but we will not follow this development here.
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infinitum. It is this that constitutes the difference between nature and art, that is to say, 
between the divine art and ours.
As this and many other sections of the Monadology make clear, a literal read-
ing of the work no longer makes sense in the light of subsequent developments. 
Cell theory, and the doctrine that each cell is formed of other cells, omnis cellula 
e cellula, was not properly articulated until the 19th century. The full synthe-
sis of a living cell from inorganic materials is still some ways off (see the 2010 
JCVI FAQ), but by now the scientific consensus treats life itself as an emer-
gent property. That said, a less literal reading, wherein life is not attributed 
to any particular monad, but to the configuration as a whole, is still feasible, 
indeed preferred. Since the genetic configuration in question is very complex 
(560 kilobases, slightly over one megabit, not counting the empty cell in which 
it is placed), it is currently beyond our materials science modeling ability. This 
leaves some maneuvering room for hard-line skeptics who deny that life can 
emerge from purely inorganic matter. But clearly, with the advent of replicating 
artificial organisms, empirical study of entelecheia is slowly becoming feasible.
3. CYCLIC FLUENTS
At this point, we have read about as much into the Monadology as we plausibly 
can. What remains is to provide a contemporary technical apparatus built from 
parts such as cyclic groups and fluents that were not at Leibniz’s disposal, and see 
to what extent his statements make sense in terms of this apparatus. Again, our 
goal is to confront our contemporary scientific understanding of the world with 
the aid of these newly reconstructed monads, treating the philological problem 
“is this really what he meant?” as secondary compared to the philosophical prob-
lem of “is this really the way things are”. That said, it takes no special effort to 
read the Monadology in the manner indicated here, and time and again we will 
call attention to sections that would, under other readings, remain highly chal-
lenging or downright mysterious.
In situation calculus (McCarthy and Hayes 1969) and other versions of ac-
tion logic, fluents are simply variables sensitive to the passage of time. In the AI/
planning literature the background is almost uniformly assumed to be absolute, 
Newtonian time. (In the past decade relative, Einsteinian time is beginning to 
get more attention, see e.g. Andréka et el. 2012, but this work also assumes an 
underlying real closed field, elementary equivalent to R.) Our current nuanced 
understanding of the real line R as a suitable theory of both one-dimensional Eu-
clidean space and of the passing of (absolute or relative) time is a relatively new 
development, starting with Cauchy, Weierstrass, Bolzano, and still significantly 
incomplete until the deeper foundational work of Tarski (1951) and robinson 
(1966). We see Leibniz as operating in an entirely different regimen, again more 
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characteristic of computer science, where discrete time is assumed as a matter 
of course. We will be working with fluents whose underlying time parameter is 
taken from a discrete set. If we use an elementary time tick t, either we obtain 
Z or, once we have t · n = 0 but no t · m = 0 for m < n, we have the cyclic group Zn 
as our basic clock wheel. §11 It follows from what has just been said, that the natural 
changes of the Monads come from an internal principle, since an external cause can have 
no influence upon their inner being. §12. But, besides the principle of the change, there 
must be a particular series of changes, which constitutes, so to speak, the specific nature 
and variety of the simple substances. §13. This particular series of changes should involve 
a multiplicity in the unit or in that which is simple. For, as every natural change takes 
place gradually, something changes and something remains unchanged; and consequently 
a simple substance must be affected and related in many ways, although it has no parts.
The simplest case, a binary ticker, has two states 0 and 1, and corresponds in 
linear time Z to the predicate even or its negation odd. Inspecting such a ticker at 
random intervals may show it more often, say with probability p > 1/2, in state 0 
than in state 1. In such case we can even it out by the same trick that we use to 
construct a fair coin from an inherently biased one, redefining “tick” as change 
from 0 to 1 or change from 1 to 0. This way, the two kinds of newly defined 
ticks become equiprobable independent of the value of p, so our clock ticks 
somewhat more evenly. There is still no guarantee that the absolute time spent 
between two ticks is exactly the same on each occasion, nor is there a guarantee 
that the “up” tick would fall exactly halfway between two “down” ticks. Nev-
ertheless, we can now have a virtual binary ticker, defined by the average of the 
time spent between up- and down-ticks.
There are hard conceptual and practical problems here, e.g. protecting the 
clock from external effects (mechanical clocks are very sensitive to tempera-
ture, and we don’t know too much about the effects of e.g. strong magnetic or 
gravitational fields on atomic clocks) and from slow drift (which may affect the 
physical constants the clock is based on). We will steer clear of these problems 
here, assuming simply that there are elementary clocks of sufficient precision, a 
move Leibniz would no doubt approve of. The easiest way to build something 
more complex from elementary clocks (cyclic groups Ci) is a clock C = Πi Ci con-
taining these. This is simply the direct (Cartesian) product of the components, 
with no provision that the Ci start off in the same state. Indeed, we can arbitrarily 
designate one step, any step, as the starting point on every face. 
We stay a step removed from the contemporary theory of cyclic groups in 
that powers of the same number must be disregarded: once we have clock Cp 
for some prime p there is no value in forming Cp × Cp as this will measure the 
exact same time p – only relative primes need apply. Leibniz would no doubt be 
seriously challenged in extending the Monadology to cases of allotropy brought 
forth by Berzelius a century later, but we are not particularly interested in the 
outcome, since by now we are reasonably certain that in contemporary materials 
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science we already have the right theory of allotropy. What we are interested in 
is applying the Monadology to those cases where our best contemporary theories 
are still fraught with difficulty, in particular, the study of entelechy.
Why do the planets revolve? Why do people strive, and if they strive so might-
ily, why do they die anyway? Leibniz is generally viewed as the person who took 
up the key issues of Aristotelian dynamics, energy and entelechy, and provided 
the philosophical underpinnings of the transition to classical physics. Yet his 
physics (for a summary see McDonough 2014) is developed in directions com-
pletely orthogonal to the direction that classical mechanics took: there is little 
in his work that truly anticipates d’Alembert, Fourier, Langrange, and Hamil-
ton, and a great deal that concerns itself with properties such as elasticity that 
remained outside the purview of classical mechanics for centuries after him. 
When Leibniz rejects Newton’s greatest invention, gravity, this is based neither 
on personal animus nor on metatheoretical considerations such as rejecting ac-
tion at a distance (though in his third letter to Dr. Clarke he certainly compares 
this to occult powers), but rather on a strongly felt need to provide a theory of 
the soul. 
The fact of the matter is that in critical respects De Anima is impossible to 
make sense of, at least in the form we have it. To Leibniz the missing part is 
the realization: how do you construct a soul?  Now that we are building all kinds 
of soulless automata, ones with remarkable sensory and motion capabilities, the 
question is even more acute. According to Iltis (1971)
What is real in nature for Leibniz is primitive force or striving, and this was developed 
by him in the succeeding years as the essence of the monad. 
planets, as far as Leibniz is concerned, will follow their prescribed orbits just by 
virtue of conservation of momentum. Unlike Newton, whose primary accom-
plishment is to unify the sublunary and the superlunary spheres by means of 
gravity, Leibniz is interested in separate theories of the two, with the Monadol-
ogy to fill the gap left by Discours de Métaphysique. When we construct a soul, we 
need good building materials, not just for immortality—obviously a nontrivial 
design goal—but also for free will. Newton himself may have believed that plan-
ets have souls (schoolbook presentations in subsequent centuries have carefully 
suppressed the occult elements in Newton’s thinking) but these are not souls 
with free will. 
Today, computer science offers a satisfactory mathematical model of free will 
in nondeterministic automata (Floyd 1967), and the very idea of using pure-
ly mathematical entities such as finite groups is sufficient to guarantee a solid 
foundation for immortality. The central contribution of the Monadology to the 
construction of a soul is the theory of entelechy it offers. §14. The passing condi-
tion, which involves and represents a multiplicity in the unit or in the simple substance, 
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is nothing but what is called Perception, which is to be distinguished from Apperception 
or Consciousness (...) In this matter the Cartesian view is extremely defective, for it treats 
as non-existent those perceptions of which we are not consciously aware. This has also led 
them to believe that minds [esprits] alone are Monads, and that there are no souls of ani-
mals nor other Entelechies. Thus, like the crowd, they have failed to distinguish between a 
prolonged unconsciousness and absolute death, which has made them fall again into the 
Scholastic prejudice of souls entirely separate [from bodies], and has even confirmed ill-
balanced minds in the opinion that souls are mortal. 
planets will continue to revolve simply because there is no dissipative force 
acting on them, but why do people continue to go on in the face of difficulties? 
The answer, we propose here, is that they are driven by entelechy, an internal 
clockwork that will go on even when they are asleep or unconscious for a pro-
longed time. §15. The activity of the internal principle which produces change or pas-
sage from one perception to another may be called Appetition. It is true that desire cannot 
always fully attain to the whole perception at which it aims, but it always obtains some of 
it and attains to new perceptions.
This provides a new answer to concerns recently raised in regards to wire-
heading (Yampolskiy 2014), the situation when rats, humans, or artificial general 
intelligences (AGIs) gain direct access to their reward mechanism and can freely 
stimulate themselves. For Leibniz, this would amount to continual resetting of 
the internal clock, with the subject being stuck in the same (pleasurable) state. 
As a practical matter, AGIs currently have no access to their utility functions 
(Lenat 1983), but the matter becomes increasingly urgent as our understanding 
of the human mind and body, and the concomitant potential for self-modifica-
tion, grows.
4. CONCLUSIONS
The main design lessons to be learned from the Monadology are rather clear. A 
basic, maybe the basic, defining element of the human condition is awareness of 
our mortality. If life is an emergent property, so is death. Of the many parallel 
working internal clocks providing entelechy, there need not be any single one 
responsible for the main cycle of our lives. Sometimes we may get a glimpse, as 
with the discovery of the mutation responsible for Huntington’s disease, a situ-
ation that ridley (2006) describes as follows: 
Either you have the Huntington’s mutation and will get the disease or not. This is 
determinism, predestination and fate on a scale of which Calvin never dreamed. 
ANDRAS KORNAI: REALIZING MONADS 161
But in general, we are still in the dark. Individual experience is practically 
worthless (premotions, if true, appear to come too late), and collective experi-
ence provides only crude statistical guidelines. The desire to tamper with one’s 
internal clock and stay forever young is universal, and if life expectancy statistics 
are to be believed, humanity is actually making noticeable gains in this regard. 
However, if we take matters into our own hands (as we should), the task is much 
larger than better understanding the genetic code or hyperfine transitions (the 
current basis of our atomic clocks). This is because for entelechy to work, we 
need §59 (...) universal harmony, according to which every substance exactly expresses 
all others through the relations it has with them. 
This is a tall order. The next question, which we cannot in any detail dis-
cuss here, is whether we can build something that provides a reasonable ap-
proximation of universal harmony the same way as computers are reasonable 
approximations of Turing Machines. The Stepped reckoner had problems with 
decimal carry that took a century to debug through payen’s Arithmomètre and 
the Tarrant-Felt Comptometer that stayed in use until the advent of electronic 
calculators. Here we are faced with a somewhat similar problem: §63. The body 
belonging to a Monad (which is its entelechy or its soul) constitutes along with the entelechy 
what may be called a living being, and along with the soul what is called an animal. 
Now this body of living being or of an animal is always organic; for, as every Monad 
is, in its own way, a mirror of the universe, and as the universe is ruled according to a 
perfect order, there must also be order in that which represents it, i.e. in the perceptions of 
the soul, and consequently there must be order in the body, through which the universe is 
represented in the soul. 
In contemporary terms, what we need is some form of knowledge representa-
tion that is as tightly coupled to the motivational system (entelechy) as to the 
sensory system. Without this, automata cannot be animated.
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